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This paper examines whether, and to what extent, the internal mobility of the 
unemployed in Spain was affected by a reform of the personal income tax that 
introduced a mobility incentive targeted at this group. The reform introduced a distinct 
change in the incentives to move for work for unemployed workers living in certain 
regions of Spain. The reform’s effectiveness is assessed by means of a difference-in-
differences econometric approach, combined with nationally representative 
administrative data. Results suggest that the reform led, at most, to relatively few new 
migration flows, and account for the existence of differential migration trends between 
the regions that adopted the reform and those that did not. 
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Introduction 
The application of Personal Taxes to individuals has been a topic of interest in the 
process of modeling the economic behavior of families. For example, the U.S. Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC), initiated in 1975, has been considered one of the best tools 
to address the economic needs of low-income families by reducing poverty and income 
inequality and increasing labor force participation (Kramer et al. 2019; Mammen et al. 
2011). In Germany, Stöwhase (2016) analyzed how horizontal equity between families 
in the tax-benefit-system is affected by the within-household distribution of earnings. 
For the case of Spain, Escario and Molina (2004) and Labeaga et al. (2011) studied the 
optimal fiscal policy on tobacco consumption, and the capacity of the Spanish tax-
system to reduce individual deprivation through a reform of the unemployment benefit 
system, respectively. 
Another European case of the impact of the reform of personal taxes on the 
family behavior is the Spanish Personal Income Tax. On January 1, 2003, the Personal 
Income Tax introduced a reduction to gross income for the registered Spanish 
unemployed who moved to a new municipality in order to accept a job offer. The so-
called Reduction for Geographical Mobility (RGM) ranged from €2,400 to €3,500 in 
the year of the move and the next, with no requirements as to the minimum duration of 
the new job or stay, providing the taxpayer lived for tax purposes in a region other than 
the Basque Country and Navarre (which have the power to regulate their own income 
taxes). Taxpayer amounts filed for RGM in the tax form totaled €35.9 million in 2003 
and €93.6 million in 2014.1 But whether and to what extent RGM stimulated the 
internal mobility of the unemployed, or served only to redistribute income to individuals 
who would have moved anyway, is unknown. In any case, by inducing a sharp change 
in the incentives to move for work, for unemployed workers living in certain regions of 
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Spain, RGM provides a unique opportunity to examine the causal effect of a large-scale 
program offering direct mobility incentives to the unemployed. 
Given the requirements for claiming RGM (described below), the focus here will 
be on internal migration of the contracted type (Silvers 1977; called “search then move” 
migration by Molho 2001). According to Molho’s (2001) model of spatial job-search, 
there are three reasons why this type of migration may have been stimulated by the 
RGM. First, subsidizing the costs of migration stimulates the locally-based unemployed 
to extend the area of search. Second, among those who do extend their search, RGM 
increases the wage required to accept a local offer and decreases that required to induce 
movement to a different area.2 And third, the unemployed may have been encouraged to 
search for jobs beyond their home municipality, as “move then search” migrants who 
landed a job in the home area could not be entitled to RGM. 
Spanish internal migration has been characterized as low by international 
standards, as well as being poorly responsive to wages and unemployment; see, for 
example, Bover and Velilla (2002). However, a growing trend in Spanish internal 
migration has been observed since 1982 (Bover and Arellano 2002: Minondo et al. 
2013). Furthermore, Mulhern and Watson (2009) conclude that its amenability to 
traditional economic reasoning has improved since the labor market became more 
flexible, and researchers made use of more disaggregated data and more sophisticated 
modelling techniques. 
Certain studies have analyzed the migration behavior of the unemployed in 
Spain. Using microdata from the Spanish Migration Survey (MS) 1987-1991, Antolin 
and Bover (1997) examined the influence of personal and regional unemployment on 
male migration, finding that the probability of migration for a registered unemployed 
individual was about four times lower than for a non-registered one. The reason why 
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RGM was targeted at registered job seekers may have something to do with this striking 
result. Related work by Ahn et al. (1999), utilizing longitudinal data from the Spanish 
Labor Force Survey (LFS) 1992-1994, found no significant differences between 
unemployment benefits recipients and the only-registered unemployed in terms of 
willingness to move for work. 
During the period analyzed in this paper (1998-2007), the statistical reference 
sources for the study of migratory movements in Spain were the Residence Variation 
Statistics (RVS) and the Spanish Migration Survey (MS), both elaborated by the 
National Statistics Institute (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, INE). Both the RVS and 
MS measure changes in the municipality of residence. An advantage of the MS, which 
was conducted in parallel with the LFS, is that it included information on migrant labor 
force status. However, and mainly because determining family movement was not a 
primary objective of the LFS (INE 2008), several studies have revealed that the MS 
underestimated the number of migrants (e.g., see Martí and Ródenas 2004). Following, 
among others, Devillanova and García-Fontes (2004) and Minondo et al. (2013), this 
paper uses the Spanish Social Security’s Continuous Sample of Work Histories to 
evaluate the effectiveness of RGM in fostering the geographical mobility of the 
unemployed. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the 
intervention. The two sections that follow review the data, the selection of the sample, 
the definition of the main variables, and the empirical strategy. In the spirit of a 
difference-in-differences approach, we exploit the fact that RGM was not adopted in the 
Basque Country and Navarre, in order to compare contracted labor migration rates 
within and (in some specifications) into adopting and non-adopting territories of Spain. 
Results are presented in the penultimate section. The key finding of this study is that 
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RGM resulted in, at best, relatively few new migration flows. We conclude in the last 
section. 
 
The reform of the Spanish Personal Income Tax 
The Spanish Personal Income Tax (PIT) Law 2002/46, with effective date January 1, 
2003, introduced a reduction to gross income for taxpayers who, being unemployed and 
registered as job seekers on Spain’s National System for Employment (NSE, the 
Spanish public employment service), accepted a job offer in a municipality other than 
that of their residence, and consequently moved to a new municipality. Officially 
designed as a means of increasing labor mobility, the so-called reduction for 
geographical mobility applied in the tax year of the move and the next,3 with no 
requirements as to the minimum duration of the accepted job or remaining in the new 
municipality, but with the provision that the taxpayer resided for PIT purposes in an 
autonomous region other than the Basque Country and Navarre.4 
The Basque Country and Navarre, which, for historical reasons, have the power 
to regulate their own income taxes, have not introduced RGM. Therefore, in terms of 
the applicability of RGM, two territories can be distinguished that coincide with the two 
models of regional financing in Spain: the so-called Common Fiscal Territory (CFT), 
where the power to tax is attributed mainly to the central government, and the Basque 
Country and Navarre (BCN), which enjoy broader taxing powers. The CFT is made up 
of the regions shown in Figure 1 (other than the BCN) plus the Balearic Islands, the 
Canary Islands, Ceuta, and Melilla. 
For purposes of the PIT, the taxpayer’s region of residence is determined 
countrywide by successively applying the following rules: i) Where the taxpayer stayed 
longer over the tax year (and it is presumed that the taxpayer stayed in the region where 
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her/his habitual dwelling is located); ii) where the taxpayer obtained the most gross 
income over the tax year; and iii) the location of the taxpayer’s last residence declared 
for PIT purposes. Thus, for example, if a registered unemployed individual living in 
Barcelona (which is in the CFT) moved to Madrid (which is also in the CFT) to work 
there from September 1, 2003, through August 31, 2004, he/she could apply RGM in 
2003 and 2004. However, if the same individual was living in Bilbao (which is in the 
BCN) and moved to Madrid to work there for the same period, he/she could apply RGM 
in 2004 only. If the registered unemployed was living in Madrid and moved to Bilbao to 
work there for the same period, he/she could apply RGM in 2003 only. 
RGM could not be claimed if the taxpayer had signed a “discontinuously 
permanent” work contract (widely used in Spain for seasonal work) and was just 
seasonally unemployed, if the taxpayer was simultaneously working and receiving 
unemployment benefits (due to, for example, a period of short-time work), or if the new 
job was a grant-paid position. The tax agency could require the taxpayer to prove the 
fulfillment of the conditions for claiming RGM. To this end, valid means of proof were 
established in Spanish Law 2000/1 on Civil Procedure (with effective date January 8, 
2001), and had to include a rental agreement as a valid means of proving the change of 
municipality. 
The reduction to gross income yielded by the RGM ranged from €2,400 to 
€3,500, depending on the taxpayer’s net labor income and nonlabor income; see Table 
1. Thus, for an individual taking the smallest possible RGM of €2,400 and a resulting 
taxable income of €12,000 in both 2003 and 2004, the tax saving was of €600 (19 
percent of the tax) in each of these years. As a comparison, the monthly unemployment 
benefit net of withheld taxes averaged €543 in 2003.5 The tax saving grew less than 
proportionally to income: For a taxpayer taking the smallest possible RGM and a 
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resulting taxable income of €24,000, the tax saving was of €726 in each of both years. 
The amount of the RGM was increased slightly in 2007, coinciding with a reform of the 
PIT (Spanish Law 2006/35, with effective date January 1, 2007). These amounts were 
further increased by 2 percent in 2008 (except for the limit on non-labor income), and 
remained unchanged until 2015, when RGM was converted into a deduction of total 
labor income of €2,000 in the tax year of the move and the next. 
The Advisory Panel on Income Tax Reform delivered its report to Spain’s 
Secretary of Finance on April 3, 2002. Although aspects of the report were covered in 
the media in the subsequent days, neither of the two measures recommended for 
encouraging the geographical mobility of labor was specifically designed for 
unemployed workers.6 Hence, it may not be too farfetched to say that it was not until 
the law 2002/46 was published on the Spanish Official Gazette (BOE) on December 19, 
2002, that the specifics of RGM began to be known to the general public. This 
circumstance raises the question of whether the slow diffusion of knowledge of RGM 
led to sluggish growth of migration rates. This possibility (which is reinforced by the 
data shown in Table 4 below) will be taken into account in the empirical specification. 
 
Data and sample selection 
Database 
The data used here to assess the effect of the RGM come from the Continuous Sample 
of Work Histories (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales, MCVL), an ongoing, 
longitudinal dataset compiled annually by Spain’s Dirección General de Ordenación de 
la Seguridad Social. In 2004, a 4-percent random sample of individuals affiliated with 
Spanish Social Security, who were either working, receiving unemployment benefits 
(UB), or receiving a pension, was selected (over 1 million individuals). The MCVL 
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gathered these individuals’ complete Social Security affiliation history, including the 
start and end dates of each affiliation spell, plus some information derived from the 
Spanish Tax Agency and the Continuous Municipal Register. These original members 
were then followed for each successive edition of the MCVL. If an original member had 
no relationship with Social Security in the year of an MCVL iteration, he/she would be 
replaced by another randomly selected individual who was affiliated with Social 
Security during that year (and for whom the complete Social Security affiliation history 
would be gathered). When an original member re-started her/his affiliation to the Social 
Security, he/she would reappear in the MCVL edition of that year. We use the MCVL 
data and fiscal information from the years 2004 to 2014. 
The MCVL provides the province and the municipality (if the latter had more 
than 40,000 inhabitants) of workplace establishments and public employment offices. In 
Spain, every employee must be associated with a Social Security contribution account 
code. This code is specific to each employer and each province, as Social Security 
legislation requires employers to keep separate contribution account codes for each 
province in which they operate. The municipality/province where the workplace 
establishment is located is the municipality/province of destination. To claim UB, the 
individual must first register in person as a job seeker at the public employment office 
associated with her/his home address, a registration which is renewed periodically. At 
the end of 2017, there were 711 public employment offices in Spain, covering all 50 
provinces, plus Ceuta and Melilla. This figure has changed little since the mid 1990s 
(cf. Toharia 1997). The municipality/province where the individual registers to claim 
UB is the municipality/province of origin. Note that the municipality/province of origin 
(destination) may not be the municipality/province where the individual lives when 
he/she is receiving UB (working). 
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Sample Selection 
The selected spells of UB received were preceded and followed by non-overlapping 
spells of employment and did not represent seasonal interruptions of the same job. As 
UB recipients are registered as job seekers in the NSE, this group satisfies the 
conditions for claiming the RGM in case of migration for work. The share of UB 
recipients among the registered unemployed in Spain was 61% in 2003.7 
Registering as a job seeker in order to claim UB seems a decision unrelated to 
the propensity to migrate. However, individuals who searched prior to quit/layoff and 
landed new jobs could have claimed UB in the interim of the job-to-job transition with 
the primary intention of claiming RGM. If these individuals did not claim UB in the 
absence of RGM, their behavior would upward-bias the estimated effect of RGM. This 
reverse-causality argument will be investigated in the Results section. 
The job prior to receiving unemployment benefits may have been left 
involuntarily or voluntarily by the worker, but the spell of benefits must have been 
terminated voluntarily (i.e. for work). The MCVL provides no information for periods 
when the unemployed worker was not receiving UB, so that one cannot know whether, 
after having exhausted UB, the individual continued to be registered at the NSE. (Even 
if we could know this, the decision to renew the registration could be related to the 
individual’s propensity to migrate for work.) Workers receiving Unemployment 
Insurance (UI) benefits had an entitlement period ranging from 4 to 24 months.8 The 
duration of Unemployment Assistance (UA) benefits was 6 months renewable up to 
maximum figures that depend on the contribution period and the age of the individual. 
The proportion of selected spells of receiving benefits that terminate voluntarily is 84%. 
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Individuals must have “accepted a job offer” to be able to apply RGM, but the 
self-employed in the new job were excluded from the sample. To be included, the new 
job must have started in the period 1998-2007, and the individual must be between 17 
years and 61 years of age at the job start date. The decade 1998-2007 was a period of 
steady economic growth in Spain, in which the unemployment rate decreased from 19 
to 8 percent. The lower bound on age is because access to UB in Spain generally 
required a minimum period of contribution of 6 months, with the minimum working age 
being 16 years. The upper bound on age is intended to keep retirement considerations 
low. Individuals aged 52 and older who were receiving UA benefits immediately before 
the new job were excluded, as legislation effective in May 26, 2002, set specific 
mobility incentives for this group. 
 
Definition of Migration 
As the province/municipality of residence is not available in the data, whether the 
unemployed worker migrated or opted instead for commuting to the new workplace is 
not clear-cut (see Giménez-Nadal and Molina 2014, 2016, 2019a, 2019b; Gimémez-
Nadal et al. 2018, 2019). To distinguish in practice between these cases, the following 
rules are applied. 
First, when the province of origin and destination were the same, it is assumed 
that the individual commuted.9 Second, when the province of origin or destination was 
an island province (the Balearic Islands, Las Palmas, Santa Cruz de Tenerife), Ceuta, or 
Melilla, it is assumed that the individual migrated. 
Third, in contiguous Spain, when the municipality of origin and destination were 
known (and were in different provinces), it is assumed that the individual migrated 
whenever the straight-line distance between municipalities was greater than 120 km, or 
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when this distance was not greater than 120 km but the travel time by car was above the 
99th percentile of one-way commuting time by car in the region of origin (listed in 
Table 2). As an example of the consequences for sample selection of this criterion, 
Table 3 shows straight-line distances and travel times by car between the 10 
municipalities of the BCN identified in the data. 25 pairs of these municipalities (out of 
the 29 possible different-province pairs) presented straight-line distances lower than 120 
km. But 19 of these 25 pairs also presented travel times by car above the corresponding 
99th percentile, and were, therefore, not excluded from the sample. 
Fourth, in connection with Catalonia and the Region of Madrid, which were the 
regions where the train was used most commonly by commuters in 2003, the individual 
migrated whenever the travel time by train between two municipalities was above the 
99th percentile of one-way commuting time by train in the region of origin.10 This 
criterion excluded the pairs Madrid – Ciudad Real, Madrid – Ávila, Madrid – Talavera 
de la Reina, and Tarragona – Castellón. 
Fifth, in contiguous Spain, when the municipalities of origin or destination were 
unknown, it is assumed that the individual migrated whenever the province of origin 
and destination were not contiguous. Finally, inter-provincial moves deemed to be 
commuting were removed from the sample in order to sharpen our central comparison. 
To what extent does the group of migrants so defined represent the treated 
group? To investigate this issue, we gathered data from the Spanish Tax Agency’s 
Statistic on Declarants of the Personal Income Tax and from the MCVL. The latter 
provides information about factors reported to the tax agency that influence the amount 
of withholding by the employer (though only for the year of that particular MCVL 
edition). Table 4 presents the total number of employer reports with the RGM item filed 
(column 1), the total number of tax returns with the RGM item filed (column 2), and the 
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population number of migrants (in our sense) (columns 3 and 4), for each year of 2003-
2007. The number of employer reports does not match the number of tax returns 
because some employees did not communicate to the employer their entitlement to 
RGM. That the number of tax returns falls short of the number of migrants may be due 
to three reasons: migrants who were unaware of their entitlement to RGM, migrants 
who were exempt from filing tax returns,11 and individuals classified as migrants who 
commuted or worked from home.12 The increase in the ratio of tax returns to migrants 
over time accords with the first reason. As to the third possibility, sources of data to 
estimate the probabilities of misclassification are unknown. 
 
Empirical Strategy 
The challenge in estimating the effect of RGM is finding a control group that credibly 
represents the mobility of UB recipients in its absence. According to the residence rules 
for PIT purposes pointed out in the second section, RGM may have induced migration 
flows within and into the CFT, and discouraged them within and into the BCN. Thus, a 
test for evaluating the usefulness of RGM is to compare the difference, by territory of 
destination, of UB recipients’ contracted migration rates before and after the 
introduction of RGM. To do this, the following linear probability model (LPM) is 
estimated by the method of ordinary least squares (OLS): 
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=
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′= + + × ×
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+ −
+ − +
∑
∑
z η
 (1) 
The binary variable ipty  is equal to 1 if UB recipient i’s job acceptance in province p 
and year t resulted in a migration, and equal to 0 otherwise, tα  denotes year fixed 
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effects, pcft  is a dummy variable for accepting a job offer in a province of the CFT, and 
iptz  is a vector of control variables explained below. As discussed by Autor and Duggan 
(2008), the parameter θ  captures a linear trend in the CFT relative to BCN, prior to the 
introduction of RGM, while β  estimates any change in this trend following the 
intervention. The linear trend may not capture all non-cyclical movements in relative 
migration rates, and may be unable to represent a slow diffusion of knowledge of RGM. 
For a more flexible trend, we use a quadratic spline function, i.e. piecewise quadratic 
polynomials with continuous first derivatives (Baum 2006): 
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  (2) 
A problem with this approach is that RGM may have induced migration flows 
into the BCN and might be irrelevant for certain migration flows into the CFT. Suppose, 
for example, that UB recipients living in Madrid (Bilbao) and accepting job offers in 
Bilbao (Madrid) consider their move to be short, so that their tax residence will not 
change. Then, RGM would (not) have induced them to migrate. Hence, a more powerful 
test for evaluating the efficacy of RGM may be given by comparing intra-territory 
contracted migration rates before and after the introduction of RGM. 
The differential change in migration flows within the CFT, relative to migration 
flows within the BCN (denoted by β  in equation 3), is expected to be positive after the 
introduction of RGM. To calculate this differential change, the following LPM (which 
is analogous to that employed by Goodman 2017 to identify the internal migration 
effects of the 2014 expansion of Medicaid in the U.S.) is estimated by OLS: 
14 
 
 
( )( )
( )( )
2007
1999
2007
2003
1998
2002 .
iptipt t
t
ipt
t
p p
p
y cft cft
cft
t
t
α δ θ
β ε
=
=
′= + + × ×
× ×
+ −
+ − +
∑
∑
z η
. (3) 
The binary variable ipty  is equal to 1 if UB recipient i’s job acceptance in year t 
resulted in migration to a province of the same territory as her/his province of origin, 
and equal to 0 if i did not migrate or migrated to a province of the other territory. 
Abusing somewhat the notation, the province of origin is denoted by p in equation (3), 
so pcft  is here a dummy variable for receiving UB in a province of the CFT. For more 
flexible trends than in the linear case, the following model is also estimated: 
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We would like to emphasize that the term pcft  captures time-constant 
differences in the propensity to migrate between the CFT and the BCN, stemming for 
example from different industry structures, culture, or institutions. Also, although the 
MCVL includes earnings data obtained from income tax records, we discarded an 
empirical approach exploiting differing “treatment intensity” across individuals or 
provinces because income in the year of the move and the next is not predetermined to 
the decision to migrate. 
In equations (1)-(4), iptz  includes the province-year unemployment rate plus 
individual characteristics that may significantly affect the decision to migrate of the 
unemployed individual (see DaVanzo 1978; Goss and Paul 1990; Goss and Schoening 
1984; Harkman 1989; Schlottmann and Herzog 1981; Tatsiramos 2009; see also Herzog 
et al. 1993 and Greenwood 1997 for surveys of the internal migration literature): A 
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quadratic in age at the job start date (measured in deviations from 35 years), educational 
attainment, whether the individual had previously migrated internally (i.e., whether the 
province of origin differed from the province where he/she was first affiliated with 
Social Security), whether the individual is an immigrant, whether the individual is male, 
the occupational skill level of the previous job, whether the individual was voluntarily 
unemployed, the duration (in weeks) of the UB spell, and whether the individual was 
receiving UA benefits immediately before the new job. (Unfortunately, the MCVL does 
not collect retrospective information on family factors affecting the decision to migrate: 
e.g., DaVanzo 1978; Lansing and Mueller 1967; Mincer 1978; Van Dijk et al. 1989.) 
Province-year unemployment rates can account for time-variant local economic 
conditions relevant to the decision to migrate, while individual-level controls can 
account for differences in the composition of the samples and can additionally provide 
precision to the estimates. 
Sample descriptive statistics are presented in Table 5. The overall contracted 
migration rate (calculated as the sample mean of ipty ) is 5.1 percent, whereas the overall 
intra-territory contracted migration rate (calculated as the sample mean of ipty ) is 4.6 
percent. Using the MCVL, but defining migrations as interregional changes, Minondo et 
al. (2013) report that, in the period 2004-2011, the proportion of economically active 
persons who accepted a job offer in a region other than that of their previous job was 
3.5 percent. 
 
Results 
Reverse Causality 
Individuals who searched prior to quit/layoff and landed new jobs could have claimed 
UB in the interim of job-to-job transitions with the primary intention of claiming RGM. 
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This behavior would show up as a prominent increase in the contracted migration rate 
of individuals with very short spells of UB receipt. Figure 2 presents contracted 
migration rates by decile of days receiving UB, for both pre-treatment and post-
treatment years. Migration rates in the second to fourth lowest deciles increased after 
the introduction of RGM, but the migration rate in the lowest decile (1 to 8 days 
receiving UB) did not. Intra-territory contracted migration rates display the same pattern 
(Figure 3). The stability of the migration rate in the lowest decile puts the reverse 
causality caveat into question. 
 
Visual Evidence of the Main Result 
Figure 4 shows the evolution of contracted migration rates by territory of destination 
(CFT or BCN) and year, as well as the difference between both. Migration rates within 
and into the CFT were higher over the whole period. The decrease and rapid increase 
observed in the series for the BCN around the year 2000 may be related to the change in 
the sign of net migration in the Basque Country. This was about -2,000 individuals in 
1998 and then grew almost steadily to some +16,000 individuals in 2007 (net migration 
in Navarre was slightly negative throughout the sample period), a fact that Sanso-
Navarro et al. (2017) relate to the declining violent activity of Euskadi ta Askatasuna 
(ETA), the Basque terrorist group. While the difference in means increased in 2003, the 
jump does not appear large and was not sustained. However, it is possible that the 
incentive to accept jobs in the CFT created by RGM was counteracted by other trends, 
as for example the decrease of ETA actions. This is the main reason why specifications 
(1)-(4) control for differential trends between the CFT and the BCN. 
Using the same layout as Figure 4, Figure 5 shows the evolution of intra-
territory contracted migration rates in the CFT and the BCN. These were much higher in 
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the former, over the whole period, as this territory comprises more provinces to migrate 
to. There is also an increase in the difference in means in 2003, which, again, does not 
appear large and was not prolonged. 
 
Regression Estimates 
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 6 present, respectively, the main estimates from 
specifications (1) to (4) above. Results in columns (1) and (2) refer to contracted 
migration rates by territory of destination, whereas those in columns (3) and (4) are for 
intra-territory contracted migration. Differential trends in migration rates are 
represented by a linear spline in odd-numbered columns and by a quadratic spline in 
even-numbered columns. 
In column (1), the estimate of .0156 (S.E. = .0102) for δ  suggests that, in 1998, 
the contracted migration rate within and into the CFT was 1.56 percentage points higher 
than the corresponding rate in the BCN. The estimate of -.0012 (S.E. = .0015) for θ  
suggests that this difference was decreasing by 0.12 percentage points per year prior to 
the introduction of RGM. According to the estimate of .0014 (S.E. = .0022) for β , this 
downward trend stopped following the policy change. Since 2002, the contracted 
migration rate within and into the CFT increased by 0.02 percentage points more per 
year than the corresponding rate in the BCN. Figure 6 plots this evolution (using a solid 
line), as well as that predicted by the estimates developed with a quadratic spline, 
shown in column 2 (using a dashed line). Looking at this figure, the overall impression 
is that RGM may have promoted migrations within and into the CFT, but the effect, if 
any, is small and does not appear to grow over time. 
The results presented in columns (3) and (4) are even less supportive of an 
effect. These results pertain to intra-territory migration flows, which provide a more 
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contrasted basis for evaluating the efficacy of RGM. In column (3), the estimate for δ  
suggests that the contracted migration rate within the CFT was 1.89 percentage points 
higher than the corresponding rate in the BCN in 1998. This discrepancy was then 
growing by 0.11 percentage points per year (S.E. = 0.16) prior to the introduction of 
RGM. The estimate of -.0002 (S.E. = .0020) for β  suggests that this tendency 
continued almost unchanged after the intervention. Figure 7 shows that this conclusion 
differs little from that yielded by the estimates developed with a quadratic spline 
presented in column (4). 
Our estimates of the effect of the RGM are certainly imprecise, which is a 
consequence of the small size of the control territory. In the sample, the number of job 
acceptances resulting in a migration within or into the BCN ranges from 70 in 1999 to 
147 in 2005. Looking back at the estimated β  in column (1) of Table 6, the top of the 
95 percent confidence interval is .0058. Assuming that the number of job acceptances in 
the CFT, plus migration rates within and into the BCN, held unchanged at their 2002 
levels, the upper bound of .0058 would imply that the population number of contracted 
migrations within or into the CFT increased by 4,531 in 2003 as a consequence of the 
intervention, corresponding to 4,050 new migrants and to 10.0 percent of the migrants 
observed in 2003 (column 4 of Table 4).13 A similar calculation suggests that, with a 95 
percent confidence, RGM would be responsible for, at most, 7.0 percent of the migrants 
within CFT observed in 2003. 
Table 6 also lists the estimated effects of the province-year unemployment rate 
and the individual-level controls. The higher the unemployment rate in the province of 
destination (the province of origin), the lower (the higher) the probability of migrating 
to (from) that province. This result concurs with Mulhern and Watson’s (2009) assertion 
that Spanish internal migration in the years 1999-2006 followed economic expectations. 
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Significant effects are also found among the individual controls. Previous internal 
migrants are 4.63 (4.43) percentage points more likely to migrate (migrate intra-
territorially) than otherwise comparable UB recipients, which represents a 92 percent 
(96 percent) increase in the propensity to migrate (migrate intra-territorially). With other 
factors held unchanged, immigrants are 1.01 percentage points more likely to migrate 
intra-territorially, whereas the effect on the likelihood of migration is measured 
imprecisely. As in Devillanova and García-Fontes (2004), the degree of mobility 
increases steadily with the qualification of the previous job. In comparison with UB 
recipients having less than a high school diploma, individuals having a high school 
diploma are 0.49 (0.72) percentage points more likely to migrate (migrate intra-
territorially), while individuals having a college degree are 0.85 (1.25) percentage points 
more likely to migrate (migrate intra-territorially). The effect of age on the likelihood of 
migration is hump-shaped, peaking at 28 years, whereas the effect on the likelihood of 
intra-territory migration decreases regularly as individuals age. Being male increases the 
likelihood of migration by 3.83 percentage points (2.85 percentage points in the case of 
intra-territory migration). As predicted by Goss and Paul (1990), UB recipients who are 
voluntarily unemployed are more mobile. In comparison with UI benefits recipients, 
UA benefits recipients are 0.97 percentage points less likely to migrate intra-territorially 
(the effect on the likelihood of migration is measured imprecisely), which is in line with 
Tatsiramos’ (2009) finding for Spain that receiving UB increases the probability of 
moving. As hypothesized by Harkman (1989), the likelihood of migration increases 
with the duration of unemployment. 
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Robustness Checks 
Table 7 presents estimated beta coefficients developed from specifications (1)-(4), but 
in which the term pcft  has been replaced by a complete set of destination/origin 
province fixed effects (thus accounting for different mobility attitudes across 
provinces), and in which the linear/quadratic spline specific to the CFT has been 
replaced by linear/quadratic splines specific to each province of destination/origin. The 
conclusion that the effect of RGM is small or nonexistent is robust to this change. 
It was assumed that the individual migrated when the travel time between two 
known municipalities in different provinces of contiguous Spain was greater than the 
99th percentile of one-way commuting time in the region of origin. Setting this 
threshold at the 99.5th percentile (listed in Table 2 for commuting by car; in the case of 
commuting by train the 99th and 99.5th percentiles are the same) reduces the incidence 
of “false positives” (i.e. commuters classified as migrants), but curtails the control 
territory. This change reduced slightly the discrepancy between RGM filings and 
migrants shown in Table 4. The number of migrants within or into the CFT (within the 
CFT) now ranges from 40,100 (38,600) in 2003 to 53,515 (51,225) in 2007. As to the 
impact on the estimated effect of RGM, Table 8 presents the main coefficients of 
specifications (1)-(4) above, re-estimated under the new definition of migration. 
Irrespective of the specification, the estimated effect of RGM appears to be non-
positive. 
 
Conclusions 
The introduction of a reduction to gross income for geographical mobility (RGM) in the 
Spanish personal income tax since the year 2003 created an incentive to move for the 
registered unemployed. A member of this population who found a job in, and moved to, 
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another municipality obtained a tax saving which (depending on individual 
circumstances) could well be more than one month of unemployment benefits. The 
incentive to move created by RGM was stronger for individuals not living in the Basque 
Country and Navarre (BCN), as these regions of Spain did not adopt RGM. Using a 
nationally representative administrative data source, this paper has quantitatively 
assessed RGM’s effectiveness among the population of unemployment benefits (UB) 
recipients, using a difference-in-differences econometric approach. Controlling for 
differential trends in migration rates between the BCN and the parts of Spain that 
adopted RGM (the so-called Common Fiscal Territory, CFT), the estimated effect of 
RGM ranges from small to nonexistent. Under some assumptions, and with a 95 percent 
confidence, RGM appears to have induced, at most, 7.0 percent (10.0 percent) of the 
UB recipients’ migration flows within (within or into) the CFT in the year 2003. 
Whether an increase in the amount of the reduction will enhance RGM’s effectiveness 
remains to be determined. 
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Table 1 Reduction for geographical mobility 
Since: Reduction to: Amount (€; in year of move and next): Amount applies if: 
Jan 1, 2003 Gross income 3,500 NI ≤ 6,500 and 0 < LI ≤ 8,200 
    
  3,500 – 0.2291(LI – 8,200) NI ≤ 6,500 and 8,200 < LI ≤ 13,000 
    
  2,400 NI > 6,500 or NI ≤ 6,500 and LI > 13,000 
    
Jan 1, 2007 Gross income 4,000 NI ≤ 6,500 and 0 < LI ≤ 9,000 
    
  4,000 – 0.35(LI – 9,000) NI ≤ 6,500 and 9,000 < LI ≤ 13,000 
    
  2,600 NI > 6,500 or NI ≤ 6,500 and LI > 13,000 
    
Jan 1, 2008 Gross income 4,080 NI ≤ 6,500 and 0 < LI ≤ 9,180 
    
  4,080 – 0.35(LI – 9,180) NI ≤ 6,500 and 9,180 < LI ≤ 13,260 
    
  2,652 NI > 6,500 or NI ≤ 6,500 and LI > 13,260 
    
Jan 1, 2015 Labor income 2,000 ‒ 
LI and NI denote net labor income and nonlabor income, respectively. LI is total labor income net of employee 
payroll taxes, union membership fees, compulsory fees to professional associations, and legal expenses in 
litigation with employers. In the joint taxation of family units, the amount of the reduction was determined by 
aggregating the incomes of all family members. 
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Table 2 Commuting time by car in Spanish regions in 2003 (minutes, 
one way) 
 
 Median 95 pctl 99 pctl 99.5 pctl 
Andalusia 20 60 90 90 
Aragon 20 40 80 90 
Asturias 20 40 60 70 
Balearic Islands 20 50 70 80 
Canary Islands 30 70 100 120 
Cantabria 20 60 70 80 
Castile and Leon 20 40 100 140 
Castile-La Mancha 20 60 60 100 
Catalonia 20 60 90 120 
Valencian Region 20 60 70 70 
Extremadura 10 40 50 70 
Galicia 20 60 70 90 
Region of Madrid 30 70 80 90 
Region of Murcia 20 60 80 90 
Navarre 20 50 60 60 
Basque Country 20 50 60 70 
La Rioja 20 40 60 80 
Ceuta 10 30 40 40 
Melilla 10 30 40 40 
Population estimates for regular working days of private sector 
employees aged 17-60. Authors’ calculations with data from the 
2002-2003 Spanish Time Use Survey. 
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Table 3 Straight-line distance (km) and travel time by car (minutes) 
between cities of the Basque Country and Navarre included in the data 
 
 Irún (GI) San Sebastián (GI) Vitoria (AL) Pamplona 
Barakaldo (BI) 97; 87 82; 74 56; 55a 122; 109 
Basauri (BI) 90; 77 74; 64 47; 48a 112; 102 
Bilbao (BI) 94; 82 79; 69 52; 51a 118; 106 
Getxo (BI) 99; 87 83; 75 62; 58a 126; 113 
Portugalete (BI) 100; 94 84; 81 60; 59a 125; 114 
Santurtzi (BI) 101; 92 86; 79 62; 58a 128; 113 
Irún (GI)   91; 85 60; 77 
San Sebastián (GI)   78; 71 62; 63 
Vitoria (AL)    85; 71 
The first entry in a cell is the straight-line distance calculated using the 
Stata program geodist. The second entry is the travel time by car under 
normal traffic conditions calculated using the Stata program georoute. 
The Basque Country is made up of three provinces: Alava (AL), Biscay 
(BI), and Gipuzkoa (GI). a: Pairs excluded from sample. 
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Table 4 Declarants of the personal income tax and migrants (by 
year) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Year 
Employer reports 
with the RGM 
item filleda 
Tax returns 
claiming the 
RGMb 
Migrants 
within 
CFTa,c 
Migrants within 
or into CFTa,d 
2003  14,176 39,150 40,650 
2004 10,700 17,038 44,225 46,400 
2005 13,425 20,338 43,925 46,150 
2006 15,575 24,693 44,925 47,600 
2007 17,300 25,506 51,950 54,300 
a: Population estimates developed with data from the MCVL. b: 
Figures from the Spanish Tax Agency’s Statistic on Declarants 
of the Personal Income Tax, including individual and joint tax 
returns claiming the RGM. c: Unemployment benefits recipients 
aged 17-60 whose job acceptance resulted in a migration (in our 
sense) within the CFT. d: Unemployment benefits recipients 
aged 17-60 whose job acceptance resulted in a migration within 
or into the CFT. 
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Table 5 Descriptive statistics: 1998-2007 Continuous Sample of Work Histories 
 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max 
Age (years) 35.39 9.59 17 60 
Unemp. duration (weeks) 10.71 11.39 0.14 72.71 
Province-year U-rate (%) 11.34 5.24 3.03 37.16 
Variable (%) Mean  Variable (%) Mean 
Migrated ( 1y = ) 5.06  University degree 9.94 
Migrated intra-area ( 1y = ) 4.62  Exactly high school 27.61 
Origin in CFT 92.33  Less than high school 62.44 
Origin in BCN 7.67  Previous internal migrant 14.05 
Destination to CFT 92.31  Immigrant 9.17 
Destination to BCN 7.69  Male 60.46 
Job acceptance in 1998 6.64  Very-high-skilled occupation 2.59 
Job acceptance in 1999 7.51  High-skilled occupation 5.29 
Job acceptance in 2000 7.81  Medium-high-skilled occupation 11.44 
Job acceptance in 2001 8.70  Medium-low-skilled occupation 54.06 
Job acceptance in 2002 9.56  Low-skilled occupation 26.63 
Job acceptance in 2003 10.14  Voluntarily unemployed 0.51 
Job acceptance in 2004 11.65  Receiving UI benefits 94.50 
Job acceptance in 2005 11.55  Receiving UA benefits 5.50 
Job acceptance in 2006 12.43    
Job acceptance in 2007 14.01    
Data relate to 355,395 job acceptances made by 163,409 unemployment benefits
recipients aged 17-60. The province-year unemployment rate is from INE. 
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Table 6 Estimated impact of the reduction for geographical mobility: changes in contracted migration rates of 
unemployment benefits recipients in the common fiscal territory relative to the Basque Country and Navarre, 1998-
2007 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Difference in contracted migration 
rates by territory of destination 
Difference in intra-territory 
contracted migration rates 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Job acceptance in CFT .0156 .0102 .0118 .0101     
Job acceptance in CFT× (year - 1998) 
× 1[year≥1999] -.0012 .0015 .0035 .0027     
Job acceptance in CFT× (year - 1998)2 
× 1[year≥1999]   -.0008 .0006     
Job acceptance in CFT× (year - 2002) 
× 1[year≥2003] .0014 .0022       
Job acceptance in CFT× (year - 2002)2 
× 1[year≥2003]   .0015 .0011     
Receiving benefits in CFT     .0189* .0107 .0168 .0116 
Receiving benefits in CFT× (year - 1998)
× 1[year≥1999]     .0011 .0016 .0038 .0035 
Receiving benefits in CFT× (year - 1998)2
× 1[year≥1999]       -.0005 .0005 
Receiving benefits in CFT× (year - 2002)
× 1[year≥2003]     -.0002 .0020   
Receiving benefits in CFT× (year - 2002)2
× 1[year≥2003]       .0008 .0008 
Destination/Origin province-year U-rate -.0019** .0009 -.0019** .0009 .0038*** .0005 .0038*** .0005 
Age (‒ 35 years) -.0003*** .0001 -.0003*** .0001 -.0004*** .0001 -.0004*** .0001 
Age squared -.00002** .00001 -.00002** .00001 -.00001 .00001 -.00001 .00001 
University degree .0085 .0053 .0085 .0053 .0125** .0052 .0125** .0052 
Exactly high school .0049** .0023 .0049** .0023 .0072** .0030 .0072** .0030 
Previous internal migrant .0463*** .0059 .0463*** .0059 .0443*** .0038 .0442*** .0038 
Immigrant .0013 .0098 .0013 .0098 .0101*** .0033 .0101*** .0033 
Male .0383*** .0054 .0383*** .0054 .0285*** .0035 .0285*** .0035 
Very-high-skilled occupation .0454** .0173 .0454** .0173 .0451*** .0114 .0451*** .0114 
High-skilled occupation .0521*** .0067 .0521*** .0067 .0525*** .0074 .0525*** .0074 
Medium-high-skilled occupation .0219*** .0017 .0219*** .0017 .0246*** .0030 .0246*** .0030 
Medium-low-skilled occupation .0170*** .0017 .0170*** .0017 .0172*** .0028 .0172*** .0028 
Voluntarily unemployed .0122** .0057 .0122** .0057 .0106* .0055 .0106* .0055 
Unemp. duration (weeks) .0002* .0001 .0002* .0001 .0002** .0001 .0002** .0001 
Receiving UA benefits .0013 .0044 .0013 .0044 -.0097*** .0026 -.0097*** .0026 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 355,395 355,395 355,395 355,395 
Clusters 52 52 52 52 
R-squared .0189 .0189 .0239 .0239 
This table reports estimated coefficients from specifications (1)-(4) in the text. In all columns, the estimation 
method is OLS and the analysis sample includes unemployment benefits recipients aged 17-60 who accepted a job 
offer. In columns (1) and (2), the explanatory variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the job acceptance resulted in a 
migration, and standard errors are clustered at the destination-province level. In columns (3) and (4), the 
explanatory variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the job acceptance resulted in a migration to a province of the same 
territory as the individual’s province of origin, and standard errors are clustered at the origin-province level. 1[.] 
denotes the indicator function. *: Significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***: significant at 1%. 
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Table 7 Estimated impact of the reduction for geographical mobility: changes in contracted migration rates of 
unemployment benefits recipients in the common fiscal territory relative to the Basque Country and Navarre, 1998-
2007 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Difference in contracted migration 
rates by territory of destination 
Difference in intra-territory 
contracted migration rates 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Job acceptance in CFT× (year - 2002)×
1[year≥2003] .0013 .0021       
Job acceptance in CFT× (year - 2002)2×
1[year≥2003]   .0019* .0011     
Receiving benefits in CFT× (year - 2002)
× 1[year≥2003]     .0002 .0012   
Receiving benefits in CFT× (year - 2002)2
× 1[year≥2003]       .0007 .0008 
Destination/Origin province fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Destination/Origin province ×  time trend YES YES YES YES 
Destination/Origin province ×  time2 trend NO YES NO YES 
Destination/Origin province-year U-rate YES YES YES YES 
Individual-level controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 355,395 355,395 355,395 355,395 
Clusters 52 52 52 52 
R-squared .0282 .0286 .0347 .0352 
This table reports estimated coefficients from specifications (1)-(4) in the text. In all columns, the estimation 
method is OLS and the analysis sample includes unemployment benefits recipients aged 17-60 who accepted a job 
offer. In columns (1) and (2), the explanatory variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the job acceptance resulted in a 
migration, and standard errors are clustered at the destination-province level. In columns (3) and (4), the 
explanatory variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the job acceptance resulted in a migration to a province of the same 
territory as the individual’s province of origin, and standard errors are clustered at the origin-province level. 1[.] 
denotes the indicator function. *: Significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***: significant at 1%. 
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Table 8 Estimated impact of the reduction for geographical mobility: Changes in contracted migration rates of 
unemployment benefits recipients in the common fiscal territory relative to the Basque Country and Navarre, 1998-
2007. Migration threshold set at 99.5th percentile of commuting time 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Difference in contracted migration 
rates by territory of destination 
Difference in intra-territory 
contracted migration rates 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Job acceptance in CFT .0204** .0098 .0160* .0095     
Job acceptance in CFT× (year - 1998) 
× 1[year≥1999] .0007 .0016 .0070** .0030     
Job acceptance in CFT× (year - 1998)2 
× 1[year≥1999]   -.0013** .0005     
Job acceptance in CFT× (year - 2002) 
× 1[year≥2003] -.0013 .0023       
Job acceptance in CFT× (year - 2002)2 
× 1[year≥2003]   .0018* .0010     
Receiving benefits in CFT     .0222* .0116 .0193 .0126 
Receiving benefits in CFT× (year - 1998)
× 1[year≥1999]     .0027* .0014 .0070** .0033 
Receiving benefits in CFT× (year - 1998)2
× 1[year≥1999]       -.0009* .0005 
Receiving benefits in CFT× (year - 2002)
× 1[year≥2003]     -.0028* .0016   
Receiving benefits in CFT× (year - 2002)2
× 1[year≥2003]       .0010 .0009 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Destination/Origin province-year U-rate YES YES YES YES 
Individual-level controls YES YES YES YES 
Observations 354,824 354,824 354,824 354,824 
Clusters 52 52 52 52 
R-squared .0186 .0186 .0245 .0245 
This table reports estimated coefficients from specifications (1)-(4) in the text. In all columns, the estimation 
method is OLS and the analysis sample includes unemployment benefits recipients aged 17-60 who accepted a job 
offer. In columns (1) and (2), the explanatory variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the job acceptance resulted in a 
migration, and standard errors are clustered at the destination-province level. In columns (3) and (4), the 
explanatory variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the job acceptance resulted in a migration to a province of the same 
territory as the individual’s province of origin, and standard errors are clustered at the origin-province level. 1[.] 
denotes the indicator function. *: Significant at 10%; **: significant at 5%; ***: significant at 1%. 
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Figure 1 Autonomous regions of contiguous Spain 
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Figure 2 Contracted migration rates of unemployment benefits recipients, by 
decile of days receiving benefits and period 
 
 
The analysis sample includes unemployment benefits recipients aged 17-60 
who accepted a job offer. Each point represents a ratio of migrations to job 
acceptances. Error bars show 95 percent confidence intervals robust to 
clustering at the destination-province level. Deciles are (0, 8], (8, 17],…, 
(174, 509]. 
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Figure 3 Intra-territory contracted migration rates of unemployment benefits 
recipients, by decile of days receiving benefits and period 
 
 
The analysis sample includes unemployment benefits recipients aged 17-60 
who accepted a job offer. Each point represents a ratio of intra-territory 
migrations to job acceptances. Error bars show 95 percent confidence 
intervals robust to clustering at the origin-province level. Deciles are (0, 8], 
(8, 17],…, (174, 509]. 
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Figure 4 Contracted migration rates by territory of destination and year 
 
 
The analysis sample includes unemployment benefits recipients aged 17-60 
who accepted a job offer. Solid and dashed lines with solid circles: Each 
point represents the ratio of migrations to job acceptances in the indicated 
territory. Dotted line with solid circles: Each point represents the difference 
in the ratio of migrations to job acceptances between the CFT and the BCN. 
Error bars show 95 percent confidence intervals robust to clustering at the 
destination-province level. 
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Figure 5 Intra-territory contracted migration rates, by territory and year 
 
 
The analysis sample includes unemployment benefits recipients aged 17-60 
who accepted a job offer. Solid and dashed lines with solid circles: Each 
point represents the ratio of intra-territory migrations to job acceptances in 
the indicated territory. Dotted line with solid circles: Each point represents 
the difference in the ratio of intra-territory migrations to job acceptances 
between the CFT and the BCN. Error bars show 95 percent confidence 
intervals robust to clustering at the origin-province level. 
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Figure 6 Estimated impact of the reduction for geographical mobility: 
difference in contracted migration rates of unemployment benefits recipients 
by territory of destination 
 
 
The figure plots the estimated difference between the CFT and the BCN as 
developed with estimates shown in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6. 
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Figure 7 Estimated impact of the reduction for geographical mobility: 
difference in intra-territory contracted migration rates of unemployment 
benefits recipients 
 
 
The figure plots the estimated difference between the CFT and the BCN as 
developed with estimates shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 6. 
 
                                                 
1
 Spanish Tax Agency’s Statistic on Declarants of the Personal Income Tax. 
2
 We showed that the reservation wage for distant offers decreases by calculating the 
derivate of a rearrangement of expression (4) of Molho (2001) with respect to the costs 
of migrating (denoted by m), and then totally differentiating expression (6) of Molho 
(2001) with respect to m. 
3
 In Spain, the personal income tax year coincides with the calendar year. 
4
 Since 1995, Spain is organized in 17 autonomous regions plus two autonomous towns 
(Ceuta and Melilla, on the north coast of Africa). For brevity, they all will be called 
“regions.” Some autonomous regions are divided into provinces, for a total of 50 
provinces. 
5
 Spain’s Ministry of Labor, Migration, and Social Security Statistical Yearbook. 
6
 The report proposed deducting moving expenses of job transfers plus a better fiscal 
arrangement for rental income. 
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7
 Spain’s Ministry of Labor, Migration, and Social Security Statistical Yearbook. 
8
 The Spanish Legislative Decree 1994/1 regulated the unemployment protection over 
the period covered by this analysis. 
9
 The only exception to this rule are moves between the municipality of Arrecife (in the 
island of Lanzarote) and the municipalities of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Santa Lucía 
de Tirajana, or Telde (in the island of Gran Canaria), all of them located in the province 
of Las Palmas. Spain’s provinces are generally small. Of the 503 pairs of same-province 
municipalities identified in the data (excluding the three inter-island cases indicated 
above), only 9 cases presented travel times by car above the 99th percentile of one-way 
commuting time by car in the corresponding region. The Stata programs geocodehere, 
geodist, and georoute were utilized to, respectively, assign geographic coordinates to 
the 147 municipalities identified in the data, calculate straight-line distances between 
pairs of municipalities, and calculate travel times by car “under normal traffic 
conditions” (Weber and Péclat 2017). The distribution of one-way commuting time by 
car in each region was calculated using the 2002-2003 Spanish Time Use Survey 
(STUS). 
10
 90 minutes in Catalonia and 110 minutes in the Region of Madrid. Travel time by 
train was taken from the National Network of Spanish Railways Organization’s (Renfe) 
website in December 2017. Commuting time by train was calculated using the 2002-
2003 STUS.  
11
 Taxpayers with labor income below a certain limit were exempt from filing tax 
returns. For taxpayers having two or more payers during the year, the limit was 8,000 
euros (10,000 euros in 2007) when the sum of the amounts received from the second 
and remaining payers in order of importance was greater than 1,000 euros (1,500 euros), 
and 22,000 euros when that sum was not greater than 1,000 euros (1,500 euros). 
44 
 
                                                                                                                                               
12
 Working from home was rather infrequent in Spain. In 2004, the proportion of male 
(female) employees aged 15+ usually working from home was 0.2 percent (0.5 percent) 
(Plantenga and Remery 2010). 
13
 In 2002, the population number of job acceptances in the CFT made by UB recipients 
living in any part of Spain was 781,275. Multiplying this number by .0058 gives the 
number of new migrations induced by RGM. In 2003, the average number of migrations 
within or into the CFT per migrant was 1.1187 (1.1169 in the case of migrations within 
the CFT). 
